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David W. Robertson"
I. INTRODUCTION: LIVING IN INTERESTING TIMES
Everyone who works in the torts field knows that the law is capable of rapid
and dramatic change. Even so, living through the last half of the 1990s in
Louisiana is reminding many experienced judges and lawyers of the fabled
Chinese curse, "may you live in interesting times." It is too early to assess the
performance of the 1997 legislature. The 1996 legislature did too much to
summarize here.' Among the more dramatic of the 1996 changes are the
provisions for assigning fault percentagesto immune and judgment-proof entities
and charging those percentages against the plaintiff's recovery;' the radical
restriction of the categories of strict liability;3 and the elimination of punitive
damages except against drunk drivers.4
In times of such politically inspired turbulence, the kind of work done in this
article-analyzing and criticizing subtle and incremental changes being made by
the judiciary in the everyday vocabulary and conceptual apparatus of the basic
law of negligence-mayseem effete. But any such characterizationwould be off
the mark. Particularly during these periodic episodes of ideological ferment,
maintaining a stable and consistent vocabulary is the essential first step toward
principled dispute resolution.
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I. For full treatment see Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil
Justice Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1996).
2. See La. Civ. Code art. 2323(A) (providing that the "fault of all persons causing or
contributing to the injury" must be quantified); L.a. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (setting out a general rule
that a tortfeasor "shall not be solidarily liable with any other person"); La. Code Civ. P. art.
18 ! 2(C)(2)(b) (giving an illustrative list of nonparties whose fault must be quantified if any party
demands it).
.Note that under La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A), solidary liability still exists among those who act in
concert to commit "intentional or willful" torts.
3. See La. Civ. Code art. 667 (confining "ultrahazardous activity" liability to "pile driving
[and] blasting with explosives"); La. Civ. Code art. 2321 (describing liability in negligence for the
owners of most animals but providing that "the owner of a dog is strictly liable" in some
circumstances); but see La. Civ. Code art. 2695 (lessor's strict liability for premises defects
unchanged by '96 legislature).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4 (providing for exemplary damages for "wanton or reckless
disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a
motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries").
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II. DoING THE GARDEN
Broadly speaking, the goals of negligence law consist in (a) assuring
adequate recompense for deserving injury victims and (b) discouraging behavior
that is unduly accident-productive while (c) protecting the innocent from
exposure to suit and liability in tort. These goals are not achievable unless those
involved in the operation of the tort-law system-judges, legislators, practicing
lawyers, and academic lawyers-speak more or less the same language. Even
when we speak the same language, we are bound to disagree. When we don't
speak the same language, we can't even be sure what we're disagreeing about.
Speaking the same language is easy when nothing much is happening-i.e.,
when the speakers are relatively few in number, isolated from other groups, and
living peaceful lives. Speaking the same language gets much harder when
strange new things keep happening, when new speakers are appearing and new
ways of thinking are emerging. Negligence law's language is bound to change,
just as all natural languages are bound to change, as its users confront new
phenomena, attitudes, possibilities, and restraints. The trick is to allow the
vocabulary to grow and develop while at the same time maintaining control.From the present point of view, part of the work of the academic lawyers
who concern ourselves with the maintenance and growth of the system of
negligence law can be seen as a form of concept gardening, involving the nurture
and care of desired growths and the ruthless extirpation of undesired growths.
Here is my concept-gardening philosophy: Useful new ideas, terms, and
approaches should be cautiously welcomed and ultimately, perhaps generously,
nurtured, but they cannot be allowed to flourish in proliferation-we've got our
beds and rows all laid out, these beautiful new plants can't just crop up wherever
they want to. And of course, lots of these new plants are far from beautiful.
They are weeds, is what they are. Weeds must be weeded out.
Occasionally I wonder whether my co-workers are sufficiently obsessed with
the need for weeding. A previous issue of the Louisiana Law Review carries
companion articles by me-"Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision
Makers in Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases"
[hereinafter "Allocating Authority"]S-and the gifted young Professor
Galligan-"Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: Some Ramblings Inspired by
Robertson" [hereinafter "Inspired Ramblings"].6 My piece describes a stable,
middle-ground vocabulary of negligence law and somewhat urgently advocates
fairly strict adherence to it. Professor Galligan's response is in a different
philosophical spirit. Galligan's concept-gardening philosophy is perhaps
epitomized by his concluding sentences:
5. David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers in
Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 La. L. Rev. 1079 (1997).
6. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: Some Ramblings Inspired
by Robertson, 57 La. L. Rev. 1119 (1997).
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[N]egligence like a cat has had many lives (or models) and, there's
more than one way to skin a cat. When dealing with something as
amorphous as negligence, flexibility seems to me to be a most attractive
virtue.7
Translated into my gardening metaphor, Galligan wants to let a thousand flowers
bloom. I am inclined to view 997 of those flowers as weeds. Friends and co-
workers, Galligan and I are nevertheless doing the garden and digging the weeds
in philosophically different ways.
III. PAGES ONE, TWO, AND THREE
At this point it may help if we drop the gardening metaphor and start
thinking about a map. At least it helps my first-year students to think of the map
of negligence law as a three-page atlas.
Page One is the plaintiff's prima facie case-what the plaintiff must
establish in order to achieve a recovery. Page Two covers the affirmative
defenses-what the defendant can establish that will either defeat or diminish the
recovery that the plaintiff provisionally achieved on Page One. Page Three deals
with multiple tortfeasor issues: issues of joint and several (solidary) liability,
contribution, indemnity, crediting for partial settlements, immune tortfeasors, and
phantom tortfeasors. 8
The main focus of this article is Page One--confusions that can eventuate
and mistakes that can occur when the contents of Page One get scrambled
together. But we must also pay attention to the conventional wisdom of staying
on the right page. Full evaluation of the desirability of any proposed change in
the law of negligence will include an assessment of how dramatic an alteration
is contemplated. Speaking very generally, modest change is better than radical
change.' When it can be seen that a proposed change entails treating the matter
at hand on a brand new page, the proposed change is revealed as potentially
radical. For example, the 1996 Louisiana Legislature's decision to virtually
eliminate solidary liability and to provide for assigning fault percentages to
immune employers and phantom tortfeasors can be criticized as conceptually
heretical for moving a set of issues traditionally treated on Page Three-designed
for allocating responsibilities among tortfeasors, for regulating the plaintiff's
7. Galligan, supra note 6, at 1132.
8. See generally David W. Robertson, The Louisiana Law of Comparative Fault: A Decade
of Progress 49-80 (LSU Law Center 1991) [hereinafter "Progress"]; David W. Robertson, Solidary
Liability in Tort: Understanding Gauthier and Touchard Part 1, 41 La. B.J. 227 (1993); and David
W. Robertson, Solidary Liability in Tort: Understanding Gauthier and Touchard Part 11, 41 La. B.J.
334 (1993).
9. A plausible case might be made for abandoning the negligence system altogether and
turning to some other apparatus for handling society's accident problem. But as long as we are
committed to the negligence system, we need to work at maintaining its conceptual integrity.
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rights to collect on his judgment, and for keeping partial settlements from being
windfalls for the plaintiff-to Page One, where it can become a virtual
elimination of the right to recover in many (and largely unforeseen) situations.'0
To take another example, recurrent efforts to bring affirmative defense of victim
fault into the analysis of the legal cause issue involves taking something from
Page Two, where the defendant has the burden of production and persuasion, and
moving it to Page One, where the plaintiff has those burdens."
IV. PROBLEMS ON PAGE ONE: SCRAMBLING THE FIVE ELEMENTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA FACIE CASE
It has come to be common ground that the plaintiff's prima facie case in
negligence law comprises these elements: duty, breach, cause in fact, legal
cause, and damages.' 2 These elements are highly useful-I would like to say
indispensable-conceptual tools. They are coming to constitute a consensus
vocabulary whereby judges, practicing lawyers, and academic lawyers can
conduct efficient conversations about particular legal problems.
10. See La. Civ. Code art. 2323(A) (providing that the "fault of all persons causing or
contributing to the injury" must be quantified); La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (setting out a general rule
that a tortfeasor "shall not be solidarily liable with any other person"); La. Code Civ. P. art.
1812(C)(2)(b) (giving an illustrative list of nonparties whose fault must be quantified if any party
demands it).
Note that under La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A), solidary liability still exists among those who act in
concert to commit "intentional or willful" torts.
Respecting the intertwined issues of solidary liability and whose negligence to quantify, the '96
legislature took the rightmost of three possible paths. Moving from left to right, those paths are:
(a) assign fault to anyone culpably involved in the accident and impose solidary liability on
defendants. This combination charges the defendant with the fault of persons with whom he or she
may have had no relationship whatever; (b) assign fault only to parties to the lawsuit and settling
tortfeasors; and impose solidary liability on defendants. (When fault is mistakenly assigned to
someone it shouldn't have been, use the ratio approach to set aside the unwanted finding.) (This was
the pre-1996 law.); (c) assign fault only to parties to the lawsuit and settling tortfeasors; and do not
impose solidary liability on defendants. (Again, use the ratio approach to set aside unwanted
findings.) (This would have been a supportable change for the '96 legislature to have made.); and
(d) assign fault to anyone culpably involved; and do not impose solidary liability on defendants. This
fourth path-the one chosen by the '96 legislature-charges the plaintiff with the fault of persons
with whom he or she had no relationship whatsoever.
11. See nfra Section Vill-C.
12. There are three functionally equivalent ways of enumerating the five elements. Probably
the most common-and to my mind, slightly the clearest-is illustrated by Justice Cole's opinion for
the court on rehearing in Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1051 (La. 1992) (enumerating duty,
breach, cause in fact, legal cause, damages). See also Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (La.
1989). The secondis illustrated by Justice Victory's opinion for the court in Pitre v. Louisiana Tech.
Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 599-90 (La. 1996) (enumerating duty, breach, cause in fact, scope of
protection, damages). A third formulation combines duty and legal cause/scope of protection into
a single element with two not-very-clearly separated subparts. This third formulation seems to be
going out of style.
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Efficient conversations are what we want to have. Picture two lawyers and
a judge, at work in a chambers conference or in court trying to get to the bottom
of a tough case. When the three of us start to grapple with this particular legal
problem, the five-element vocabulary will help us get quickly on the same wave
length without an undue expenditure of energy or ink. Then, as we start to get
down to serious work, the common vocabulary and conceptual structure can help
us find our way to the relevant authorities; to interpret those authorities; to
identify and begin to understand the policies being served by those authorities;
and to try to specify with precision (and thus narrow toward manageability) the
points of disagreement among us.'"
If you agree with me that a common vocabulary-a consistent conceptual
structure-is essential to reasoned negligence-law discourse, then you may also
agree with the usefulness of identifying the potential and recurrent types of
confusion among the five elements on Page One. There being five elements that
need to be kept straight, the theoretically possible categories of confusion among
them are ten in number."4  Happily, not all ten need treatment here. The
important potential confusions are only half as many: duty with breach, duty
with legal cause, breach with legal cause, cause in fact with legal cause, and
cause in fact with damages. I have treated many of these combinations in other
papers and publications.' 5 The matters requiring attention here are the
relationships among the breach, cause-in-fact, and legal cause issues.
V. DEFINING THE BREACH AND CAUSE-IN-FACT ELEMENTS
There is little danger of confising, conflating, or coalescing the breach and
cause-in-fact issues. 6 These two issues are definitionally and conceptually
13. The bedrock disagreements-stemming from the lawyers' chosen positions and the judge's
value system-will not disappear, but we can save a lot of time by precisely identifying them. Dean
Leon Green was fond of saying that the legal vocabulary is useful in a limited sense: It is like a
horse that you can ride to the general vicinity of the problem at hand, whereupon you must get down
and walk. He was right, of course. But we must not forget that riding is better than walking, and
good horses are better than poor ones.
14. Duty can conceivably be confused with the other four (4); breach, with duty plus the other
three (3); cause in fact, with the foregoing two plus legal cause and damages (2); legal cause, with
the foregoing three plus damages (I). 4+3+2+1 - 10.
15. See David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 142, 156-57, 160-67, 179-94
(1989); David W. Robertson, An American Perspective [on Negligence Law], in Tort Law 193-227
(3d ed. 1994); Robertson, Progress, supra note 8, at21-32; David W. Robertson, The Common Sense
of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1765 (1997) [hereinafter "Common Sense"]; Robertson, supra note
5; David W. Robertson, Liability In Negligence for Nervous Shock, 57 Mod. L. Rev. 649 (1994);
David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty/Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses,
and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev.
1341 (1984) [hereinafter "Ruminations"].
16. In his opinion for the unanimous seventeen-member Fifth Circuit in Gautreaux v. Scurlock
Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that Jones Act plaintiffs owe
reasonable care for their own safety, not "slight care" as had been believed), Judge Duht bundled
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quite separate and distinct from one another. In this section we will examine the
standard definitions of the breach and cause-in-fact issues. These definitions will
then serve as benchmarks for the discussions in the subsequent sections of the
article.
A. Beach
When analyzing the breach issue, one assumes arguendo that the defendant
owed a duty of reasonable care 7 and asks whether he or she breached it. The
issue has several names, including breach, substandard conduct, and negligence
with a lower-case "n." Under whatever name, we are here asking whether the
defendant violated the duty of reasonable care that we have established or are
provisionally assuming is owed.
To determine whether the defendant violated the duty of reasonable care, we
ask whether the seriousness of expectable injury risked by the defendant's
conduct multiplied by the probability of such injury's occurrence outweighs the
burden of taking adequate protections against it.' This question can be
summarized in useful symbols as B<PL,"9 with "B" standing for the burden that
taking adequate precautions would have imposed upon the defendant, "P" the
probability of injury, and "L" the injury.20
If the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that B<PL, the
defendant's conduct was negligent.2' The B<PL question incorporates the
perspective of a hypothetical person of ordinary prudence ("POP") in the position
the breach and cause-in-fact issues togcther in a surprising way. But I don't think he was confused;
coalescing the two issues served a rhetorical purpose. I am working on a paper for possible future
publication that analyzes the Gautreaux decision.
17. One assumes the existence of duty arguendo or--as is more frequently the case-sees with
clarity that the existence of duty is readily established. I don't agree that the case with which the
duty element is often satisfied makes that concept "meaningless," as Professor Galligan states in
Galligan, supra note 6, at 1120. When duty is easily established, this simply means that the law is
clear. The law is at its most meaningful when it is clear. Galligan probably used "meaningless" in
the sense of "uninteresting."
18. Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994); Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
202 So. 2d 704, 710-12 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 204 So. 2d 574 (1967).
19. Asking B<PL rather than B>PL reflects the general rule imposing the burden of persuasion
on the plaintiff.
20. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J., for
the court). "Burden" here is a very broad idea, potentially encompassing inquiry into the purposes
of the defendant's activity that produced the injury; what it would have cost the defendant in time,
money, and other goods to add accident precautions or otherwise alter the activity sufficiently to cut
down on the risk of injury; and how well any suggested precautions would have worked. In an early
piece presaging Learned Hand's famed B<PL summarization, Henry Terry laid down a five-factor
formulation for determining "the reasonableness of a given risk." Terry's first two factors were what
later became "P" and "L"; his other three elaborated the "B" part of the balancing. Henry T. Terry,
Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42-43 (1915).
21. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
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of the defendant.2 If in light of B and PL that person would have acted
differently-less dangerously-than did the defendant, the defendant's conduct
was substandard. The substandard conduct question is for the jury unless
reasonable minds could not differ. The jury's inquiry may be sharpened by
evidence as to customary practices in defendant's profession, trade, or industry
and/or by expert opinion testimony, but its answer to the breach question is
ultimately an expression of the jury's normative preferences. 3
The B<PL inquiry is sometimes called the Hand formula, after Judge
Learned Hand, who may have been the first to articulate it clearly. 4 In
Inspired Ramblings, Professor Galligan says "the value served by the Hand
formula is economic efficiency."'" Galligan's emphasis on "the" imports a
significant exaggeration, I think. On both the B and PL sides of the scales,
courts and juries often take into account values that are in no meaningful sense
economic,"6 and properly so. At bottom, the breach issue is simply (but
potentially comprehensively) whether the defendant behaved properly, as judged
by his peers. There is more to proper behavior than economics.
B. Cause In Fact
The cause-in-fact element addresses the causal connection between the
defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injury." The most widely
used conceptual frame for testing that connection is the but-for inquiry. This
deceptively simple test asks whether the injury in suit would have occurred if the
defendant had avoided the wrongful conduct at issue in the lawsuit. Everyone
who moves about in the world successfully applies the but-for test countless
22. In general, the hypothetical POP is objectified. But defendant's superior knowledge and
skill as well as his physical characteristics (including disadvantages) will be attributed to POP. And
if the defendant is a child, POP becomes a fairly subjective construct, taking on the attributes incident
to defendant's own age, intelligence, and experience.
23. The application ofgeneral norms to particular situations is part of the jury's traditional role.
Issues like the breach element in the negligence-law cause of action are sometimes called "mixed
question[s]" of law and fact. David W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in
Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. 78, 93 (1968).
24. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
25. Galligan, supra note 6, at 1124 (emphasis in original).
26. See. e.g., Roberts v. State, 396 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 3d Cir.), af d on other grounds, 404
So. 2d 1221 (1981) (treating a blind man's aesthetic and spiritual need to move around at times
without his cane as a sufficiently weighty "B" to offset the likelihood that he might bump into and
injure someone); Kimbar v. Estis, 135 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1956) (weighing campers' aesthetic
preferences for darkness against the dangers of darkness). Lately some of the proponents and
opponents of the "law & economics" school of academic tort law have been assuming that B<PL?
focuses solely on money. The assumption is historically inaccurate. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 20
passim.
27. For full treatment see Robertson, Common Sense, supra note 15.
28. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven.
Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 85 (1975) (referring to "the virtual universality" of the but-for test).
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times each day, usually without conscious thought. 29 But properly framing and
answering the but-for inquiry in a lawsuit is a significantly complex mental
operation involving five essential steps.3 The first four steps are required to
carefully pose the question. The fifth step tries to answer the question posed.
The first step is to identify the injury or injuries for which redress is sought.
This step usually causes no trouble. However, when it does present difficulties
they can be substantial."
Second, identify the defendant's wrongful conduct. Extreme caution is
necessary here. It does not help the plaintiff to show that her injuries would not
have happened if the defendant's parents had never met. The plaintiff must show
that her injuries probably would not have happened if the defendant had not
engaged in the particular conduct alleged (and ultimately proved) in the lawsuit
as wrongful."
The third step is where most of the mistakes occur." This step requires
using the imagination to create a counter-factual hypothesis. Create a mental
29. Any purposive action implicitly tests a but-for hypothesis: What will happen if I do that?
What if I don't?
30. The second circuit's decision on rehearing in Bannerman v. Bishop, 688 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 685 So. 2d 146 (La. 1997), closely tracks the suggested five-step
approach. See Bannerman, 688 So. 2d at 576-77 (Brown, J., dissenting on original hearing and fully
spelling out the five-step approach); id. at 579 (Brown, J., writing for the court on rehearing and
sketching the five-step approach).
31. Two types of difficulties involved with identifying the injuries in suit are dealt with in
Greer v. Lammico, 688 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997). One difficulty the Greet court
confronted was evaluating the worth of a reduction in plaintiffs chances of surviving cancer from
75% to something below 50%. See generally Smith v. Department of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d
543 (La. 1996). The second was deciding what a health care provider who settles a medical
malpractice lawsuit under the Medical Malpractice Act should be deemed to have confessed for
purposes of the patient's subsequent lawsuit against the Patients' Compensation Fund. See generally
Pendleton v. Barrett, 675 So. 2d 720 (La. 1996); Graham v. Burkett, 690 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1997).
32. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage
Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1970): "The determination of cause-in-fact is launched by fixing
as precisely as possible the piece of conduct-the exact act or omission-with which the defendant
is charged." In his early work Dean Green agreed with the Malone formulation of the cause-in-fact
issue. See Leon Green, Judge and Jury 229-30 (1930); Leon Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause
passim (1927). But late in his career-and without announcing it as a change of viewpoint-Dean
Green began contending that cause in fact is satisfied when a causal connection exists between the
injuries and the defendant's entire course ofconduct. Some of his followers took up this broad view.
See, e.g.. William L. Crowe, The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian. as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has
Been Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903, 904-05 (1976); E. Wayne Thode, The
Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 423, 424-25
(1968). But it remains a minority academic position, shared by only a few analysts and having no
discernible judicial influence.
33. The Normannia, 62 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894), is a wonderful illustration of a first-class
mistake. Plaintiff booked first-cabin passage from Southampton to New York. A cholera epidemic
then broke out in Europe. Wishing to cancel his -trip if steerage passengers were to be aboard the
ship, plaintiff sought and received assurances from the vessel's agent that no steerage passengers
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picture of a situation identical to the actual facts of the case at hand in all
respects except one: "correct" the defendant's wrongful conduct to the minimal
extent necessary to make it conform to the law's requirements. In all aspects this
third step must be kept conservative and modest. The hypothesis must be
counter-factual only to the extent necessary to ask the but-for question. Only the
defendant's wrongful conduct must be "changed," and that only to the extent
necessary to make it conform to the requirements of law.3" It will be seen that
the mental precision required here is a corollary of the step two requirement of
"fixing as precisely as possible the piece of conduct-the exact act or omis-
sion-with which the defendant is charged."" At step three, one mentally
alters only that piece of conduct, and one keeps the alteration modest, "changing"
the defendant's behavior only enough to make it non-tortious.
The fourth step asks the key question: would the injuries of which the
plaintiff complains probably have been avoided if the defendant had behaved
lawfully in the sense just indicated?
The fifth step in the but-for inquiry is answering the question. If the four
inquiry-formulating steps have been done correctly, answering the question will
usually be easy.
In visualizing the five-step process, a videotape metaphor may be of use.
After identifying the injuries in suit and the wrongful conduct, back up the tape
to the point of injury. Stop the tape. Change only one thing: change the
would be carried. But once the ship was under way, plaintiff learned that five hundred steerage
passengers were aboard. When the ship reached New York, it had to be quarantined for two weeks.
(If no steerage passengers had been aboard, the quarantine period would have been half that.)
Plaintiff did not come down with cholera, but as a result of the two-week incarceration he suffered
minor illness and business losses, for which he sued.
In limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the results of the second week of quarantine, the Normannia
court fumbled the cause-in-fact analysis. The court correctly identified the wrongful conduct as the
agent's misrepresentation. Id. at 471. But when it came time to "correct" that conduct for purposes
of asking the but-for question, the court didn't do the obvious thing, which would have been to ask
what would have happened if the agent had told the truth. (Answer: the plaintiff would not have
made the trip, thereby avoiding all of the injuries in suit.) Instead, the court "corrected" the agent's
misrepresentation by taking the steerage passengers off the ship. Id. at 482. If there had been no
steerage passengers, the plaintiff would have sailed, and the ship would have been quarantined for
one week, not two. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff's damages were limited to those
stemming from the second week of quarantine. This was wrong. Lest you think it was justifiable
as some kind of legal cause limit, note that this was an intentional tort case-fraudulent misrepresen-
tation-as to which the ambit of responsibility has traditionally been regarded as almost as extensive
as the reach of factual causation. Normannia wasn't a debatable legal cause case; it was a wrongly
decided cause-in-fact case.
34. The law's preference for an intellectually conservative "correction" flows from the
realization that the but-for test incorporates a counter-factual inquiry-asking what would have
happened under a factual scenario that never actually existed-and a felt need to keep that kind of
speculation as narrowly confined as possible. Courts often emphasize the necessity of focusing the
but-for inquiry in this way. See. e.g., Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (La. 1976);
Farley v. M. M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755-56 (Tex. 1975).
35. Malone, supra note 32, at 370.
19971
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defendant's conduct to the extent necessary to make it conform to law. In other
words, change the accident scene only as necessary to reflect the assumption that
the defendant is now conducting herself properly. Don t change anything else.
Now, with the defendant behaving properly and lawfully-with defendant's
wrongful conduct out of the picture-rn the tape forward. Do you see the
plaintiff being injured? If so, defendant's wrongful conduct was not a cause in
fact of the injury; it was irrelevant. Do you see the plaintiff escaping injury?
If you see that clearly enough, then the defendant's wrongful conduct was a
cause in fact of the injury. Do you see snow on the screen, no picture, just
static? If so, the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof on the issue of
factual causation. 
6
C Ross's Recap
The foregoing definitions show that keeping the breach and cause-in-fact
issues separated is no great trick. It's just this simple: The breach question asks
whether defendant acted right. The cause-in-fact question asks what would have
happened (would the plaintiff still have been hurt?) if the defendant had acted
right.
VI. THE LEGAL CAUSE ISSUE
A. As Distinguished From Cause In Fact
Legal cause is the emerging term-a significant improvement-for what
used to be called proximate cause.7 The modem view is that the legal cause
issue "has nothing to do either with cause or proximity."3  Rather, the term
legal cause is a synonym for "the scope of liability or scope of protection
element" in the duty/risk analysis. 9 As Chief Judge Marvin recently observed
for the second circuit:
"Cause" in legal cause or proximate cause is a misnomer because the
scope of duty inquiry is actually an inquiry into whether a legal
standard of care exists and into policies for and against extending the
asserted legal standard of care to protect the particular plaintiff against
the particular harm."0
36. At this point, the law sometimes steps in with justice-serving mitigations such as the
substantial factor test. See generally Robertson, Common Sense, supra note 15.
37. See Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 5 & n.5 (La. 1989); cf. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
& Keeton on Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter "Prosser & Keeton"].
38. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032. 1052 (La. 1991) (on rehearing).
39. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. 1994).
40. Weaverv. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 615 So. 2d 1375, 1381 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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The foregoing expressions suggest that at the judicial level,* conceptual
confusion between the cause-in-fact and legal cause issues should not be much
of a problem. For the most part, that is true. However, any time the same term
is used for different ideas, occasional confusion is guaranteed.
Moreover, it is not at all clear whether juries understand what they are
expected to do with legal cause interrogatories."' And jury findings of "no
legal cause" are often hard to interpret. Indeed, whether juries should even be
used to determine legal cause is significantly controversial.
The following subsections approach the legal cause issue in a way that I
hope can shed some light on the tangle of difficulties involved with using juries
to answer the legal cause question. Subsection B presents a brief (modem)
history of the emergence and use of the legal cause concept in Louisiana law.
This history generates the definitional structure described in Subsection C.
Subsection D then tries to demarcate the breach and legal cause issues and to
explain why the law of negligence needs both. Subsection E argues that juries
are suitable decision makers for the legal cause issue.
The use of juries to determine the breach, cause-in-fact, and legal cause
issues necessitates attention to the details of putting these questions to jurors in
intelligible form. Section VII below suggests that it would probably improve
jury trials if separate cause-in-fact and legal cause interrogatories were used and
makes a beginning effort at formulating some jury instructions that might help
clarify juries' attention to the cause-in-fact and legal cause issues."
B. The Legal Cause/Scope of Protection Issue: Dixie Drive It Yourself to
Date
Anglo-American tort law arrived early at the principle-nowadays usually
known as negligence per sel3-that tort liability can sometimes be predicated
41. Puzzling over Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1812 and 1813 leaves me
suspicious that there may be some subtle distinction between what Article 1813 calls "interrogatories"
and Article 1812 calls "special verdicts." I don't want to get involved with any such subtlety if I can
help it. In this paper I am using the term "interrogatories" to mean particular questions put to juries;
this meaning embraces (and indeed specifically focuses upon) the "special verdicts" provided for in
Article 1812.
42. In trying to formulate my own suggested jury instructions, I imply no critique of H. Alston
Johnson, II, Civil Jurylnstructions, in 18 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1994). As I appreciate that
work's philosophy and intent, it was aimed at reflecting current practice rather than proposing
changes.
While implying no critique of that work, I do have one passing thought about the portions I have
studied--§§ 3.03 (cause in fact), 3.04 and 3.05 (breach), and 3.15 through 3.17 (legal cause). I think
these sections may tend to tell the jury more law than it is likely to be able to use effectively. If I
were to undertake an ambitious task like Johnson's Volume 19, the result would surely not be better,
but it might be shorter.
43. In Robertson, supra note 5, 1 demonstrate that the oft-stated notion that Louisiana has no
negligence per se doctrine is false.
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upon the defendant's violation of a penal statute. The 1874 decision in Gorris v.
Scott stated that principle and its key limitations in now-classic language:
[W]hen penalties are imposed for the violation of a statutory duty, a
person aggrieved by its violation may sometimes maintain an action [in
tort] for the damage so caused, [but only when] the object of the statute
is to confer a benefit on individuals [of the class to which the plaintiff
belongs] and to protect them against the evil consequences which the
statute was designed to prevent, and which have in fact ensued....
A good modem formulation of the Gorris v. Scott criteria is as follows:
In determining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is
negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the
purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person falls
within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the
harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against.45
As will appear more fully below, the class-of-persons and type-of-harm
criteria emanating from Gorris served the same function in negligenceperse cases
that the proximate cause issue served in ordinary negligence cases: confining the
defendant's liability to those persons and interests for whose protection the rule
of law violated by the defendant was designed. Thus, requiring the plaintiff in a
negligence per se case to satisfy the proximate cause requirement as well as the
Gorris criteria involved some duplication-proximate cause was a conceptually
redundant hurdle (over which hapless plaintiffs would trip from time to time on
a somewhat random basis). Nonetheless, courts routinely engaged in the
redundancy.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Dixie Drive It Yourself
System v. American Beverage Co." became famous for attacking that redundancy
by holding that the proximate cause hurdle should not be imposed in negligence
per se cases. The plaintiff's vehicle-negligently driven by one whose negligent
conduct was not imputable to the plaintiff-was damaged when it collided with
a disabled truck that the defendant had parked on the highway without signal flags
in violation of a statute. The lower courts exonerated the defendant on the view
that the negligence of the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle was "the sole proximate
cause" of the accident. Reversing, the supreme court stated:
This restrictive [proximate cause] doctrine finds little support in legal
theory. We do not subscribe to the formulation as applied in this case.
The essence of the present inquiry is whether the risk and harm
encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection of the
44. 9 Ex. 125, 128 (Court of Exchequer 1874).
45. Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
46. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962).
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statute. It is a hazard problem. Specifically, it involves a determination
of whether the statutory duty of displaying signal flags and responsibility
for protecting traffic were designed, at least in part, to afford protection
to the class of claimants of which plaintiff is a member from the hazard
of confused or inattentive drivers colliding with stationary vehicles on the
highway.' 7
It will be seen that the supreme court's Dixie holding made eminent sense: the
court simply applied the Gorris criteria and held that they supplanted the
conceptually redundant (but randomly dangerous) proximate cause issue.
A decade later, the supreme court took the next big step in Hill v. Lundin
& Associates.'" Hill was not a negligence per se case: defendant's conduct
was wrongful because it fell below the law's requirement of reasonable care, not
because the legislature had prohibited it. That distinction, said the court, made
no appreciable analytical difference:
Where the rule of law upon which a plaintiff relies for imposing a duty
is based upon a statute, the court attempts to interpret legislative intent
as to the risk contemplated by the legal duty, which is often a resort to
the court's own judgment of the scope of protection intended by the
legislature. Where the rule of law is jurisprudential and the court is
without the aid of legislative intent, the process of determining the risk
encompassed within the rule of law is nevertheless similar. The same
policy considerations which would motivate a legislative body to impose
duties to protect from certain risks are applied by the court in making
its [scope-of-protection] determination.' 9
The Hill court indicated that the scope-of-protection determination-which in the
Dixie situation asks about the supposed scope of protection of a legislative
rule-is in the Hill situation furthered by asking whether there is an "ease of
association of the injury with the rule [i.e., the jurisprudentially-imposed
requirement of reasonable care] relied upon. 50
Hill thus took Dixie (and Gorris) from the field of negligence per se into the
field of ordinary negligence. The Hill decision was heralded as ushering in a
new era of Louisiana jurisprudence,"' in which a carefully articulated scope-of-
protection inquiry would replace all references to proximate or legal causation.
In this brave new world, "causation" would refer to cause in fact and only that.
47. Dixie Drive It Yourself, 242 -La. at 488, 137 So. 2d at 304.
48. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
49. Hill, 260 La. at 549-50, 256 So. 2d at 622-23 (citations omitted).
50. Hill, 260 La. at 549, 256 So. 2d at 622.
5I. See. e.g., David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
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In the working law, things never work out that neatly. Almost immediately
after Hill the supreme court went back to the vocabulary of proximate cause."2
But over the next decade or so, the word "proximate" fell from favor, to be
replaced by "legal," and "legal cause" was repeatedly translated in "scope of
protection" terms." The terms are now widely regarded as fully synony-
mous.
54
C. Defining Legal Cause
When one tracks the evolution of the scope of protection/legal cause issue
from its beginnings in Gorris through Dixie and Hill and into present usage, it
can be seen that the question addressed by the issue in both negligence per se
and ordinary negligence cases is this: Was the rule of law violated by the
defendant designed to protect the plaintiff's general class of persons against the
harm the plaintiff suffered?
In a negligence per se case, it is easy to identify the rule of law violated by
the defendant: It is the statute invoked by the plaintiff as the basis for the
negligence per se allegation.
In an ordinary negligence case, the rule of law violated by the defendant is
not quite as easy to identify. But the difficulty is manageable. In an ordinary
negligence case, the plaintiff proves that the defendant violated the law by
proving that he or she engaged in conduct that was less than reasonable care
under the circumstances. In order to establish that the defendant did not exercise
reasonable care, the plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that the
defendant's conduct created or exacerbatedone or more foreseeablerisks of harm
to others. That array of risks-the array of foreseeable risks of harm that the
defendant should have guarded against-identifies and defines the rule of law the
defendant violated. The legal cause issue then becomes: was the injury that
befell the plaintiff among or associated with the array of foreseeable risks the
existence of which required the defendant to alter his or her conduct?
The foregoing formulation of the legal cause issue serves to define that issue
and to foreshadow our discussion in Subsection D below of how to demarcate
it from the breach issue. A couple of examples may be useful. In the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co.," the
52. See Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So. 2d 286, 289 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., for the court, using a
proximate cause analysis in a case in which the defendant violated parish and city building codes);
Frank v. Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1293, 1294-96 (La. 1977) (Dixon, J., for the court, using a proximate
cause analysis in an ordinary negligence case); id. at 1296 (Tate, J., concurring, and offering a
translation of "legal cause" as including cause in fact plus a requirement that "the duty violated...
have included within its purpose the prevention of the risk encountered by the plaintifi').
53. Kessler v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 476, 478 (La. 1991); Wright v. O'Neal, 427
So. 2d 852, 853-54 (La. 1983); Carter v. City-Parish Gov't of East Baton Rouge, 423 So. 2d 1080,
1084 (La. 1982).
54. See, e.g., Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. 1994).
55. 744 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1987).
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defendant company negligently allowed one of its employees with a terrible
driving record to keep a company truck for his personal use. The employee
loaned the truck to a friend of his, and the friend drove negligently and injured
the plaintiff. The court's holding was no legal cause. 6 The defendant's
conduct was negligent because of an array of foreseeable risks centering on the
likelihood that the employee would drive badly enough to hurt someone. The
risk that he would loan the truck to another bad driver was neither among nor
easily associated with that array. Had the plaintiff proved that the employee was
a poor risk with a truck not only because of his history of bad driving but also
because of a history of keeping bad company, the plaintiff's legal cause case
would have been appreciably stronger.
To take another example, a failure to demarcate the breach and legal cause
elements arguably led the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal to a wrong
decision in Charles v. Lavergne," in which the defendant negligently drove his
truck at fifty miles per hour through a "Men Working" area of the highway.
Defendant's conduct was negligent principally because of the risk of running
over one of the work crew. But defendant did not hit one of the crew. Instead,
his truck's speed in running over an electrical cable lying across the highway
caused the cable to bounce up and become entangled in the truck's rear axle; this
in turn pulled down a utility pole atop which the plaintiff, one of the work crew,
was busy at the time."8 When the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
denial of recovery, it seemed to me (and to Judge Domengeaux, dissenting) to
ask the wrong question. The court's analysis focused on whether the risk of
pulling down a utility pole with a worker atop it was foreseeable enough to
require the defendant to slow down.59 It wasn't, so defendant was exonerated.
In my view, the right question would have been whether the particular harm that
befell the plaintiff was "easily,associated"' with the array of foreseeable risks
that required the defendant to abate his speed. That question would probably
have been answered affirmatively. Judge Domengeaux's dissent put it very well:
56. Id. at 595.
57. 412 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
58. The Charles court raced past the cause-in-fact issue almost as fast as the defendant's truck
went through the "Men Working" zone, stating that "there is no question that the accident would not
have occurred but for the defendant['s] driving his truck across the cable stretched across the road."
Charles, 412 So. 2d at 728. But that wasn't the right cause-in-fact question. As is explained supra
in Section V-B, the cause-in-fact inquiry addresses whether the plaintiff's injuries would have been
avoided had the defendant avoided the wrohgfful conduct proved against him. The evidence in
Charles showed that the truck was going too fast, but it did not show that a reasonably driven truck
would have somehow gone around the cable. Hence, the proper cause-in-fact question was whether
the truck's excessive speed caused the cable to bounce up and get tangled in the axle: Would the
cable have been engaged had the truck been proceeding at a proper speed? The third circuit assumed
no-hence it assumed the presence of cause in fact-os shall we for purposes of discussion.
59. Id. at 729-30.
60. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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It is quite apparent, at least in my eyes, that the defendant's duty to
slow down and proceed cautiously existed not only to prevent motorists
from striking workers, ... but it also existed to avoid any accident
which could have reasonably been associated with the work going on in
the area.6
D. Demarcating the Breach and Legal Cause Issues: Why Do We Need
Both?
In Inspired Ramblings, Professor Galligan says that "the things juries look
at when considering proximate cause overlap with the things they look at when
considering breach."" This observation leads him to wonder "whether we need
two separate elements" and to suggest that the presence of the second-the legal
cause element-may be mere window dressing:
Maybe [we have both a breach and a legal cause element] because law
has got to have some minimum number of serious elements and if there
aren't enough elements to be respectable it's embarrassing. Again, to
steal a page from Professor Henderson, maybe the only way to get
people to think there is law here is to make it look more like law. Too
few elements (articulated criteria upon which to base decision)'don't
look like law. So adding elements, even if they overlap[,] makes
negligence look more like law.63
In my view, Galligan is twice wrong here. The breach and legal cause elements
do not overlap-not when they're done right-so the legal cause element needs
no nouveau-realpolitik explanation."
One can readily see that the breach and legal cause elements do not overlap
simply by imagining a negligence system without the legal cause requirement,
viz., one in which the plaintiff's prima facie case in negligence law consisted in
the duty, breach, cause-in-fact, and damages elements."5 Suppose Lewis v.
61. Charles, 412 So. 2d at 731.
62. Galligan, supra note 6, at 1130.
63. Id. Galligan goes on in "[I]ess cynical[]" vein to set forth a more traditional explanation
for the presence of the legal cause element. But his favorite is evidently the cynical one quoted in
the text above.
64. "Nouveau-realpolitik" may not be a precise description--maybe American Legal Realism
Revisited, or Goodnatured Critical Legal Studies, or Nondestructive Deconstructionism would be
better-but I feel the need to disagree with Professor Galligan in three languages.
65. No great leap of imagination is entailed. Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,
78 S. Ct. 394 (1958), held that there is no legal cause requirement in seamen's actions against their
employers. But the lower courts have refused to follow Kernan-without saying they are
refusing-by confining its reasoning in various ways. One recurrent argumert for narrowing Kernan
looks to Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117 n.5, 83 S. Ct. 659, 665 n.5 (1963):
"Kernan... was concerned with... [a] statutory or regulatory duty [a Coast Guard regulation] and
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Kehoe Academy" had arisen in such a system. In that case, the negligence of
a day camp for children led to a toddler's ingesting rat poison. One of the
effects of the poison was to exaggerate the appearance of some minor bruises on
the child's body. When the child-protection authorities saw the bruises, they
thought the child had been abused and took the child away from the plaintiffs,
its custodial parents.67 In the suit against the day camp for the damages
incident to the loss of custody, the duty, negligence, cause-in-fact, and damages
elements were all easily established."' Yet there was no liability, and I believe
most observers would agree with the court that there should not have been:
[T]he operators and employees of a day camp have a duty to exercise
reasonable care in preventing the young campers from ingesting rat
poison. That duty, however, does not encompass the risk that, if the
poison causes accentuation of subsequently incurred bruises, the juvenile
court will reach the erroneous conclusion that the child was neglect-
ed.69
The legal cause element certainly did not overlap with the breach element
in Lewis. In Lewis we needed the legal cause element to keep the defendant
from being "liable for all consequences [of its conduct] spiralling outward until
the end of time."7° The duty, breach, cause-in-fact, and damages issues won't
do that-not as those issues are presently constituted.
Of course, one could make the legal cause element superfluous--creating a
system with four functioning elements rather than five-by altering the breach
element in such a way as to make it do the work of legal cause. Analytically,
this would be easy: Rather than determining breach (B<PL) as we do now, with
PL referring to the full array of foreseeable risks shown by the evidence to have
been created or exacerbated by the defendant's conduct, we could limit the PL
does not control or purport to define the content of nonstatutory or nonregulatory duties amounting
to negligence. ... But this use of Gallick is illicit, or nearly so; the Gallick footnote addressed the
breach issue-the negligence per se aspects of Kernan-and not the legal cause issue. In truth, the
Supreme Court has never backed away from Kernan. The lower courts have managed to back away
from it without any help from the top.
66. 346 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 291. The child lived with her aunt and uncle.
68. Id. at 292.
69. Id.
70. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1052 (La. 1991) (on rehearing). For a fuller
expression of the same thought, see Alumni Ass'n v. Sullivan, 535 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987): "Even where [defendant was guilty of negligent conduct] and that conduct [was a] cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff's harm, the law makes a determination that, at some point along the causal chain,
liability will be limited. The term 'proximate cause,' or 'legal cause' is applied by courts to those
considerations which limit liability, even where the fact of causation can be demonstrated. Because
of convenience, public policy, or a rough sense ofjustice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series
of events beyond a certain point, as no longer a 'proximate' or 'legal' consequence naturally flowing
from the wrongdoer's misconduct."
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reference to the particular injury that befell the plaintiff. Thus, in Lewis, the
breach inquiry would change from the present inquiry-whether the risk that
children would eat rat poison and get sick or die was foreseeable and serious
enough to require greater precautions from the day camp-to a new
inquiry-whether the risk that rat poison would mislead the juvenile authorities
into taking a child away from its custodial parents was foreseeable and serious
enough to require greater precautions from the day camp. We answer the actual
breach question (in bold type above) yes, because we want day camps to spend
enough on safety to protect the children. We would answer the hypothesized
new breach question (in italics above) no, because no one should spend a dime
on a risk as farfetched as that. Thus, our altered breach element would get us
-the answer we want in Lewis.
But the trouble is, our altered breach element would also get us lots of
answers we don't want. For example, I believe the third circuit got the wrong
answer in Charles v. Lavergne"' because it effectively coalesced the breach and
legal cause elements into a single inquiry whether the risk that a worker on a
utility pole would be thrown to the ground was foreseeable and serious enough
to require the defendant to slow down. In Wagon Mound I-in the course of
relieving the defendant shipowner from liability for a fire resulting from the
inadvertent discharge of furnace oil onto the surface of Botany Bay-the Privy
Council explicitly adopted just such a coalesced breach/legal cause inquiry. 2
Very soon thereafter, in Wagon Mound II, the Privy Council retreated from its
new formulation and imposed liability on the very same defendant for the very
same fire.73 The formulation that coalesces breach and legal cause is simply too
restrictive. 4 We need the legal cause requirement to keep negligent defendants
71. 412 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying note 57.
72. Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound 1), 1961 App. Case
388 (appeal taken from New S. Wales). "Suppose an action brought by A for damage caused by the
carelessness (a neutral word) of B, for example a fire caused by the careless spillage of oil. It may,
of course, become relevant to know what duty B owed to A, but the only liability that is in question
is the liability for damage by fire. It is vain to isolate the liability from its context and to say that
B is or is not liable and then to ask for what damage he is liable. For his liability is in respect of
that damage and no other. If, as admittedly it is, B's liability (culpability) depends on the reasonable
foreseeability of the consequent damage, how is that to be determined except by the foreseeability
of the damage which in fact happened-the damage in suit?" This is tight reasoning from a false
premise. When the Privy Council said that culpability "admittedly" depends "on the reasonable
foreseeability of" the "damage in suit," it generated the false premise. In the traditional formulation,
culpability (negligence; breach) depends on the reasonable foreseeability of the array of risks shown
by the evidence to have been created or exacerbated by the defendant's conduct, not just the damage
in suit.
73. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound II), [196711 App..
Case 617 (P.C. 1966) (appeal taken from New S. Wales).
74. Post-Wagon Mound cases like Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837, and Smith v..
Leech Brain & Co., [1962) 2 Q.B. 405, show that the English courts do not follow any such
restrictive formula.
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from being held liable "for all consequences... until the end of time,"75 but
we don't want a rule that would routinely exculpate conduct merely because the
foreseeable risk that the conduct created does not happen to be the particular risk
that befell the plaintiff.
The formulation that coalesces breach and legal cause-sometimes called
"the Wagon. Mound aberration"--is bad law because it would restrict liability
more than anyone seriously thinks liability should be restricted. And it is bad
law for another reason as well: It is a distortion of the normal meaning of the
term negligent conduct.7" As Judge Andrews indicated in his famous dissent
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., when a motorist speeds through an area
crowded with pedestrians, we don't say he wasn't negligent merely because he
was lucky enough to avoid hitting anybody that time." Similarly, when a
trucker speeds through a gang of workers, managing to miss them all but instead
engaging a cable that pulls a worker from atop a utility pole, we don't say the
trucker wasn't negligent merely because the worker he managed to injure wasn't
part of the core group most seriously threatened by his conduct. If we want to
let the trucker go free, it is not because he wasn't at fault. We may sometimes
say to either or both of these speeders, "Well, you got away with it this time."
But we surely don't say, "Good job, you got through there real quick and missed
them all."
E. Normally the Legal Cause Issue Is For the Trier of Fact
The Louisiana Supreme Court has vacillated on whether legal cause should
be a question of law or a question of fact, 78 and the lower court decisions
sometimes reflect the uncertainty.79 However, prevailing practice treats the
issue as one for the trier of fact."0 Indeed, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
75. See cases cited in supra note 70.
76. What normal English speakers mean by "negligence" is centrally important to the law's
purposes. Juries are used to decide the negligence (breach) issue because the law seeks the
community's assessment of blameworthiness-in a free society we don't look to officials,
bureaucrats, or experts to tell us how we should act. Thus I think Professor Galligan may be on the
wrong track in supposing that we use juries to determine the breach issue merely because we are
"ashamed" at our inability to define negligence and consequently "pretend" that negligence
determinations are "Law" in order to "save[] face." Galligan, supra note 6, at 1123. Why denigrate
the community assessment of blame that is at the heart of the negligence-law system?
77. 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting): "Should we drive down Broadway
at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike an approaching car or miss it by an inch."
78. See Kenney v. Cox, 652 So. 2d 992, 992 (La. 1995) (Dennis, J., concurring): "(Olur
jurisprudence has not clarified the distinction between the existence of a general duty of care (a legal
question) and the 'legal cause' or 'duty/risk' question of the particular duty owed in a particular
factual context (a mixed question of law and fact) ......
79. See Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 663 So. 2d 515, 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995),
writ denied, 666 So. 2d 680 (1996) (documenting the uncertainty).
80. Section Vill infra treats a number o recent cases in which "legal cause" interrogatories
were put to juries.
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article 1812(C) requires the trial judge to submit a legal cause interrogatory to
the jury if either party wants it."a
Professor Galligan is by no means alone in thinking it would make more
sense to have the legal cause issue decided by the judge rather than the jury. He
takes that position in Inspired Ramblings2 as well as in earlier publications,
stating:
[In negligence per se cases] it is sensible to have the judges make [the
scope-of-protection] decision... because it is appropriate for judges,
rather than juries, to interpret and decide the scope of statutes. A
statute's scope is a question of legislative intent, purpose and policy for
which judges seem well trained. But if proximate cause in [ordinary]
negligence cases is a question of policy, why don't judges get to decide
proximate cause questions, too? 3
Here again I respectfully disagree in part with Professor Galligan. I believe
the answer to his rhetorical question is this: Judges decide the scope-of-
protection issue in negligence per se cases because as a generic matter-as a
matter of institutional tradition entirely extrinsic to the law of negligence-the
business of discerning what was "intended by the legislature" 4 falls into the
realm of legal expertise. But in ordinary negligence cases, the rule whose scope
of protection is tested by the legal cause inquiry comes not from the legislature
and not (except in the general form of a breach instruction) from the judiciary,
but from the trier of fact itself. The trier of fact is well situated to determine the
appropriate scope of protection of its own implicitly articulated rule. That rule's
proper scope of protection is a "question of policy," all right. But it is the trier
of fact's own policy.
Let me explain how triers of fact implicitly articulate rules and policies of
negligence law. When a trucker speeds through a "Men Working" area of the
highway, the breach inquiry asks the trier of fact whether the trucker should have
slowed down to avoid injuring the workmen. If the answer to that question is
no, the case is over-no breach, no tort. But if the answer to that question is
yes, the trier of fact has thereby instantiated a rule of negligence law; it has said
to the defendant, "You should have slowed down to reduce the risk of injuring
81. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C): "in cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the
court at the request of any party shall submit to the jury special written questions inquiring as to:
(I) Whether a party from whom damages are claimed, or the person for whom such party is legally
responsible, was at fault, and, if so: (a) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and,
if so: (b) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage." Subsections (2) and (3) go on to make
the same provision respecting the fault of nonparty tortfeasors and of plaintiffs. See supra note 2
and accompanying text
82. Galligan, supra note 6, at 1130-31.
83. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Hill v. Lundin & Associates Revisited: Duty Risked to Death?
14 (LSU Law Center 1993).
84. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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those workers." The legal cause/scope-of-protection "question of policy" then
becomes whether that rule's scope of protection extends to the worker atop the
utility pole. The trier of fact is well situated to determine the intended scope of
protection of its own implicitly articulated rule. It is the trier of fact who should
determine whether the risk that befell the plaintiff is properly and easily
associated with the array of foreseeable risks that has led the trier of fact to
conclude that the defendant's conduct was blameworthy.
Thus, it makes sense for the trier of fact to make the scope-of-protec-
tion/legal cause call because the trier of fact knows-better than virtually anyone
else-just why the defendant should be regarded as blameworthy and whether
that blameworthiness is extensive enough to embrace the plaintiff's particular
harm.
When the trier of fact is a trial judge, his or her knowledge of why and to
what appropriate extent the defendant is blameworthy is superior to everyone
else's. When the trier of fact is a jury, its knowledge on those matters is
superior to everyone else's except the trial judge's (who, like the jury, has seen
the parties, heard the testimony, and viewed the evidence, face-to-face and fact-
by-fact). It would be fine for trial judges in jury-tried cases to decide legal cause
issues. But under our present conceptual apparatus, effecting that allocation of
authority-with the jury deciding the cause-in-fact and breach issues and the trial
judge deciding the legal cause issue-would entail calling the legal cause issue
an issue of law. And it is not an issue of law. One can intelligently answer the
legal cause/scope-of-protection question in a particular case only after hearing
enough evidence to know in a fairly precise way why and to what extent the
defendant's conduct was blameworthy. Thus, the legal cause issue should not be
denominated an issue of law. It should not be decided by summary judgment
except in the most obvious of cases. It should not be reviewed de novo on
appeal.
VII. IMPROVING THE JURY'S Focus: SUGGESTED CAUSATION
INTERROGATORIES AND INSTRUCTIONS
As we will see more fully in Section VIII below, appellate courts frequently
have trouble with cases in which juries have answered the breach question yes
and the legal cause question no. Sometimes it is hard to tell what the jury meant
by such answers. The biggest trouble is that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1812(C) calls for breach and "legal cause" interrogatories85 but not for
a cause-in-factinterrogatory. Thus, trial judges evidently feel obliged to give the
jury a kind of composite "legal cause" question-with accompanying instruc-
tions-combining the cause-in-fact and legal cause/scope-of-protection issues
into a single interrogatory.
85. "Interrogatories" means specific questions put to juries. See supra note 41. "Instructions"
means explanations of the law provided to juries to assist them in answering the interrogatories.
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If I am right that it is essential to the intelligent functioning of the
negligence-law system for judges and lawyers to keep the cause-in-fact issue and
the legal cause/scope-of-protection issue separated, then it is obviously a bad
idea to invite juries to put them together. Article 1812(C) needs to be amended
to cure this problem. But surely no serious worker in the negligence field wants
to go anywhere near the legislature with any of our concerns. Thus, we should
investigate what judges might do to cure or alleviate the difficulty.
Most obviously, courts could give juries two causation interrogatories rather
than just one. 6 I don't think anyone will seriously contend that doing so would
violate legislative intent. When the legislature used the term "legal cause" in
Article 1812(C), it must have meant to include the two agreed constituents-the
cause-in-fact and legal cause/scope-of-protection elements. What is now being
asked of juries in the form of a single "legal cause" question should be broken
out into two questions, seeking the following information: (a) Was the negligent
conduct of the defendant a cause [in fact] of the injuries to the plaintiff? (b)
Was the event that injured the plaintiff a reasonably foreseeable or easily
associated result of the defendant's negligent conduct?
The foregoing paragraph indicates the thrust and intent of the proposed new
interrogatories, but not how to word and explain them to the jury. The proper
wording of jury interrogatories and instructions is notoriously difficult busi-
ness,87 and all I can offer here are some beginning suggestions. In the four
paragraphs immediately below, we will look at the breach, cause-in-fact, and
legal cause/scope-of-protection issues in the context of a specific situation and
set forth the interrogatories and instructions that I think should be used to enlist
the jury's assistance in resolving these three issues.88
For our specific situation, we can use a hypothetical case based on Charles
v. Lavergne,9 in which the truck sped through the "Men Working" zone,
became entangled with a cable, and pulled down the utility pole atop which the
plaintiff was working. No statutory violation was alleged; the plaintiff's claim
was simply that the trucker failed to use reasonable care under the circumstances.
86. Writing for the second circuit in Chambers v. Grabiel, 639 So. 2d 361, 366 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 377 (1994), Judge Norris-whose work is almost always wise and
good, in my experience-makes the surprising suggestion that separating the cause-in-fact and legal
cause/scope-of-protection interrogatories should be avoided because it would force the jury to "probe
the difficult distinction between 'cause in fact' and 'legal cause' of an accident." I do not think that
is right. I think it would force the trial judge and lawyers to probe that distinction, a little bit, but
that it would serve to free juries of any such task. Here it seems to me Norris nodded.
87. See supra note 42.
88. In concocting my proposed interrogatories and instructions, I have borrowed freely from
Johnson, supra note 42, from reported decisions, and from the Texas Pattern Jury Charges..
89. The principal hypothetical feature of our case is the use of a jury. Charles v. Lavergne,
412 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), itself, was a bench trial in which Judge G. Bradford Ware's
exoneration of the trucker was affirmed by the third circuit (Swift and Laborde, JJ. with
Domengeaux, J., dissenting).
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The three inquiries below indicate what I think the Charles v. Lavergne jury
needs to be asked and told (with each suggested interrogatory followed
immediately by suggested instructions in italics):"o
(1) Was [the tucker's] conduct negligent under the circumstances
shown by the evidence?
"Negligent conduct" means conduct that fails to use reasonable
care. "Reasonable care" means the degree of care that would be used
by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circum-
stances. A person engages in negligent conduct when he or she fails to
do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same
or similar circumstances, as well as when he or she does something that
a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or
similar circumstances.91
(2) Was [the trucker's] negligent conduct a cause 92 of the injuries to
[the plaintiff]?
"Cause" means a necessary contributing factor. The law recogniz-
es that each event and each injury has many causes. Ifyou believe that
the plaintiff would probably not have suffered the claimed injuries in the
absence of the defendant's negligent conduct, then you should answer
this question yes. If you believe that the plaintiff probably would have
suffered those injuries regardless of what the defendant did or failed to
do, then you should answer this question no.93
(3) Was the event that injured [the plaintiff] a reasonably foreseeable
result of [the trucker's] negligent conduct?
"Event" means the general circumstances of the injury as it befell
the plaintiff. If you believe that a person in [the trucker's] situation
would have foreseen that [the plaintiffs] injuries, or some similar event,
90. The jury should get the interrogatories and instructions in writing. In criminal cases,
Official Revision Comment (d) to La. Code Crim. P. art. 801 has been interpreted to preclude written
instructions. State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 226 (La. 1996). I can find no similar prohibition
in La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1792-96.
91. The immediate focus of this portion of this article is how juries should determine the two
causation issues. This breach interrogatory-accompanied by instructions--is necessary background.
92. I think "cause" means "cause-in-fact" to laymen. If I am right about that, then adding the
words "in fact" to the interrogatory might imply that we are asking about something arcane, whereas
what we are trying to do is precisely the opposite. See infra note 95.
93. In Robertson, Common Sense. supra note 15, 1 set forth a relatively small range of
situations in which courts are justified in shifting from the but-for test of cause-in-fact to the less
rigorous substantial factor test. In the relatively rare situations in which that shift is justified, the
cause-in-fact interrogatory would not be altered, but the accompanying instructions would change.
In those situations, the instructions would state: "'Cause' means a substantial contributing factor.
The law recognizes that each event and each injury has many causes. If you believe that the
defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries, then you
should answer this question yes. If you believe that the defendant's negligence played no appreciable
part in bringing about or contributing to the plaintiff's injuries, then you should answer this question
no."
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might reasonably result from his conduct, then you should answer this
question yes. Ifyou believe that [the plaintiff's] injuries were a wholly
unforeseeable event, of a sort not easily associated with the risks
involved with [the trucker's] conduct, then you should answer this
question no.
Probably no judge or lawyer will find that the foregoing suggested
interrogatories and instructions perfectly match his or her understanding of the
law of negligence. But I think they get the key questions asked and the key
ideas across, with a minimum of fuss. It is easy to err on the side of over-
elaborate instructions. Juries know what negligent conduct is; that is why we
convene them.9" They also know what cause means." My breach and cause-
in-fact instructions and interrogatories enlist the jury's innate and intuitive
understanding of blameworthiness and factual causation without perverting it
with a flood of legalese.
My suggested legal cause/scope-of-protection interrogatory and instructions
are potentially more controversial. My omission of the word "cause" from this
inquiry probably will not inspire much debate; it seems obvious that we should
avoid using the same word for different purposes when alternative phrasings are
readily available. But I think people will want to argue about the rest of it, and
particularly with the emphasis on foreseeability. Despite the fact that "ease of
association" is the preferred judicial articulation of the key legal cause
criterion-as opposed to foreseeability-my suggestion features foreseeability as
the dominant concept. I do not think that "ease of association" should be the
question put to the jury, because I doubt that ease of association can be made
intelligible for juries in any suitably economical way. The core idea of legal
cause is that one's liability for the result of one's negligent conduct should stop
at the point where the consequence is too cockeyed and farfetched. I think my
suggestion gets that idea across, using "ease of association" in a subsidiary rather
than a dominant role.
VIII. ILLUSTRATIVE RECENT CASES
A. Demarcating the Cause-In-Fact and Legal Cause Issues
The cause-in-fact issue-asking whether the injuries in the suit would have
been avoided if the defendant had "acted right"--can do powerful work all by
94. See supra Section V-A and note 76.
95. See William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971): "(Cause-in-fact] is a
question of fact. It is, furthermore, a fact upon which all the learning, literature and lore of the law
are largely lost. It is a matter upon which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as
the most experienced court. For that reason, in the ordinary case, it is peculiarly a question for the
jury."
96. See supra Section V-C.
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itself. For the most part that work is not reflected in reported cases, because
cases in which the plaintiff cannot satisfy the cause-in-fact element rarely reach
the litigation stage. Jenkins v. Lindsey97 is thus of pedagogical interest. Ms.
Jenkins was hurt in a car wreck in March 1995 and further injured in May 1996
when a Wal-Mart employee pushed a string of shopping carts into her, maybe
on purpose. Confronting the issue of whether the traffic tortfeasor was
responsible for the injuries, the fourth circuit said of course not: "[T]here is no
causal relationship as a matter of law between the original automobile accident
and the subsequent accident with the shopping carts."98 This was a straight
cause-in-fact call; the traffic tortfeasor simply had nothing to do with the
injuries. The fourth circuit mentioned some other issues on its way to the cause-
in-fact conclusion, leading Frank Maraist's Louisiana Civil Law and Procedure
Newsletter to present Jenkins under the caption "Negligence; Scope of the Risks."
But the cause-in-fact issue was dispositive.
More typically, the cause-in-fact issue shows up in reported litigation in
company with the legal cause and/or breach issues. One recurrent trouble area
involves jury interrogatories: in cases in which the evidence would support a
finding of cause in fact, how should the question be put to the jury? Recent
cases suggest three answers, none of them very satisfactory in my opinion. (a)
In Clement v. Griffin the fourth circuit concluded that the "legal cause"
interrogatory and instructions used by the trial court failed to put the cause-in-
fact issue before the jury at all." (b) In Chambers v. Graybiel'° and Weaver
v. Valley Electric Membership Corp.' the second circuit was satisfied with
interrogatories that evidently tucked the cause-in-fact issue into the breach issue.
(c) More typically, courts seem to use a single "legal cause" interrogatory that
is deemed to combine the cause-in-fact and legal cause/scope-of-protection
inquiries.'02
Obviously, aside from cases in which the facts support and the trial judge
intends a directed verdict on the issue, failing to put the cause-in-fact issue to the
jury is unacceptable. Tucking the cause-in-fact issue into the breach issue will
no doubt often permit the jury to do justice but as a general proposition seems
too uncertain in focus. In Chambers the jury was asked whether an allegedly
97. 693 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at. 241.
99. 634 So. 2d 412, 430-31 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 478 (1994).
100. 639 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 672 So. 2d 907 (1996).
101. 615 So. 2d 1375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
102. See Bannerman v. Bishop, 688 So. 2d 570, 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 685
So. 2d 146 (1997) (quoting interrogatories asking the jury (a) whether the defendant was "guilty of
any fault or negligence" and (b) whether "the negligence or fault of [defendant was] a proximate
cause" of the injuries in the suit); Johnson v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, 669 So. 2d 577,
581 (La. App. ist Cir.), writ denied, 672 So. 2d 907 (1996); Norris v. Guthrie, 641 So. 2d 978, 979
(La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 646 So. 2d 382 (1994); Rabito v. Otis Elevator Co., 633 So. 2d 368,
371 n.1 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted and case remanded, 638 So. 2d 1075 (1994); Magee v.
Coats, 598 So. 2d 531, 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
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negligent motorist was guilty of "negligence which was the cause of this
accident."1°3 The Weaver opinion does not quote the question put to the jury
but indicates that in the particular circumstances presented there, the term
"negligence" alone was deemed adequate to carry the cause-in-fact freight.' °4
Tucking the cause-in-fact issue into the legal cause/scope-of-protection
issue-in the form of a single "legal cause" interrogatory deemed to combine
both elements, evidently the standard approach-is also problematic, most often
because it can leave the trial and appellate judges in the dark as to what the jury
might have meant by a negative answer to the interrogatory. In Bannerman v.
Bishop, a 14-year-old motorist ran a stop sign and collided with an 81-year-old
motorist whose car then struck a tree, causing fatal injuries. The jury found that
the kid was "guilty of... fault or negligence" but that his "negligence or fault
[was not] a proximate cause" of the woman's injuries and death.' °5 On
original hearing, the second circuit affirmed the resultant judgment for the
defendant, concluding that when the jury said "no legal cause" it probably meant
"no cause in fact." (There was evidence that the 81-year-old woman may have
fainted before the collision and that her car might have been headed for the tree
regardless of the impact with the boy's car.) The court then reversed itself on
rehearing, concluding that neither of the potential meanings of the jury's "no
legal cause" conclusion was supportable. As to cause in fact: "To suggest that
this accident would have occurred without Godfrey's [the 14-year-old's]
negligence is fanciful supposition. Godfrey's negligence was a cause in fact of
the accident and resulting injuries."'16 As to legal cause/scope of protection:
"Clearly, the scope of protection against a motorist running a stop sign protects
this driver from this type of harm arising in this manner."'
0 7
It will be seen that, with the issues of cause in fact and legal cause/scope of
protection properly separated in Bannerman, the majority of the second circuit
on rehearing found each relatively easy to deal with.' Perhaps the case would
not have needed to go through the rehearing stage if the issues had beem
separated for the jury in the first place." 9
103. Chambers, 639 So. 2d at 368.
104. See Weaver, 615 So. 2d at 1378: "[Thejury's answers to interrogatories ... first declared
that the defendant power company, VEMCO, was negligent, but secondly and on the other hand, that
VEMCO's negligence was not a 'legal cause' of the accident." Id. at 1379: "Negligence, by
definition, is conduct which breaches a legal duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff and causes in
fact injury to plaintiff." (emphasis in original; citation omitted). Id. at 1382: "Here we have no
difficulty with the factual inquiry and conclusion of the jury [that] VEMCO's (conduct] was a cause-
In-fact of the harm that befell Weaver." (emphasis in original).
105. 688 So. 2d 570, 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 685 So. 2d 146 (1997).
106. Bannerman, 688 So. 2d at 579.
107. Id. at 580.
108. Judges Sexton and Hightower dissented on rehearing, believing the jury's cause-in-fact
resolution to be adequately supported by the record.
109. On how to separate cause in fact from legal cause, I note a number of cases stating: "The
cause in fact test requires that but for the defendant's conduct, the injuries would not have been
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B. Demarcating the Breach and Legal Cause Issues
Section VI-D above asserts that "[t]he breach and legal cause elements do
not overlap ... when they're done right."'"10 Often the separation between the
two elements is crystal clear. For example, in Daigrepont v. State Racing
Commission, a jockey who fell during a race when another horse came into his
lane sought to hold the racing stewards responsible for his injuries because of
their fault in allowing the other horse's rider-an alien with an expired U.S.
Employment Authorization Card-to participate.' That argument went
nowhere: "[T]he stewards owed Daigrepont no duty to remove Vilchis because
of his subsequent immigration status. To make an association between Vilchis's
subsequent immigration status and Daigrepont's head injuries is simply
unrealistic.' 12, It may be worth pausing for a moment to examine why the
court's conclusion strikes us as so obviously correct." 3 It is because the rule
allegedly violated by the stewards-try to see that all the alien jockeys have
proper work authorizations-is clearly designed to protect against harms to the
economy (and perhaps the polity) rather than for safety reasons. If there is any
basis for believing that illegal aliens are more dangerous riders than legal ones,
the Daigrepont plaintiff failed to invoke it.
It will sometimes be to the defendant's advantage to point out and develop
the clear separation between the breach and legal cause elements. In Norris v.
Guthrie, the defendant was an 18-year-old whose fault consisted in buying illegal
beer for a 17-year-old." 4  Later that evening the 17-year-old attacked and
injured the plaintiff, who was dating the 17-year-old's former girlfriend.
Upholding a judgment on a jury verdict that found the 18-year-old negligent but
not a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the fifth circuit said only: "The
sustained. The legal causation test requires that there be a substantial relationship between the
conduct complained of and the harm incurred." Fowler v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 485 So.
2d 168, 170 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 487 So. 2d 441 (1986) (citing Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391
So. 2d 821 (La. 1980)); Mack v. City of Monroe, 595 So. 2d 353, 355-56 (La. App. 2d Cir.), nrit
denied, 599 So. 2d 314 (1992) (quoting Nichols v. Nichols, 556 So. 2d 876, 879 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ not considered, 561 So. 2d 92 (La. 1990)). This use of the but-for test for cause in fact and a
"substantial relationship" test for legal cause nicely captures the distinction between the two elements,
and does so in an economical and evocative way. My only concern is that the term "substantial" is
busy doing other work-in the "substantial factor" test for cause in fact, an alternative to the but-for
test that is appropriate in a limited but recurrent range of situations-and any time we try to use the
same term for different purposes, we end up confusing ourselves sooner or later. See generally
Robertson, Common Sense, supra note 15.
110. See supra text accompanying note 64.
111. Daigrepont v. State Racing Comm'n, 688 So. 2d 1290, 1290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 1293.
113. Cause-in-fact considerations don't explain it. If the stewards had removed Vilchis, the
replacement jockey would not have ridden the race the same way Vilchis did, and the odds are that
the particular encounter that hurt Daigrepont would not have come about.
114. Norris v. Guthrie, 641 So. 2d 978, 978 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 646 So. 2d 381
(1994).
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instant jury was not clearly wrong in finding [the 18-year-old] guilty of some
negligent acts but not responsible for the fight that resulted in [plaintiff's]
injuries."'" s Here again, a ready justification for the court's conclusion can be
found in the clear separation between the breach and legal cause elements: The
rule violated by the beer buyer was designed to protect the morals of minors and
perhaps against traffic and similar accidental injuries incident to teen-age
intoxication. Its protection does not sensibly extend to a neighborhood fight that
could well have occurred without the assistance of alcohol.' 1
When separating the breach and legal cause elements is not helpful to their
positions, defendants often try the opposite tack of urging a coalesced breach-
legal cause question-the Wagon Mound aberration"--on the court. The
defendant hospital in Smith v. Louisiana Health and Human Resources
Adminstration failed to keep close watch on a mentally unstable patient, who
stole an ambulance and hurt himself by crashing it into a construction barricade.
The hospital urged the Wagon Mound aberration on the fourth circuit by arguing
that the particular risk that befell the plaintiff-that he would "go to the
emergency room ramp and take an ambulance" and then crash it-was too
unforeseeable to require the defendant to take precautions against it.", The
fourth circuit's opinion in Smith rejected the Wagon Mound aberration by
carefully separating the breach and legal cause inquiries. The breach inqui-
ry-B<PL-came out in plaintiff's favor because on the PL side of the scale
belonged not just the risk that a deranged patient would steal and crash an
ambulance but an entire range of "[e]veryday hazards in and around a hospital
in the middle of a major city, . . . such as stairs, machinery, or traffic, [that] are
dire threats to a person in a confused and disoriented mental state.'' Once
the breach issue was separated from the legal cause issue and properly
formulated, the fourth circuit found the legal cause issue relatively easy:
While the particular harm that befell Mr. Smith might not have been
foreseeable, that harm lay within the scope of the general range of risks
to which Mr. Smith was peculiarly subject due to his mental state. The
particular harm which befell Mr. Smith, while unusual, is easily enough
associated with the failure to keep Mr. Smith either under restraint or
under continuous observation. It is also easily associated with other
foreseeable harms that could have befallen Mr. Smith, so that it is
within the scope of the risk to be protected against by the breached
duty.1 20
115. Id. at 981.
116. It is unclear whether Norris has an alternative cause-in-fact justification. We don't know
what the 17-year-old would have done if he had been sober when he rode past and saw the plaintiff
with his old girlfriend.
117. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
118. 637 So. 2d 1177, 1181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 1183.
120. Id. at 1184.
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C. Staying on the Right Page: Demarcating the Legal Cause and Victim
Fault Issues
The adoption of a "pure" comparative negligence statute like Louisiana Civil
Code article 2323 imposes some hard choices on the courts. In a pure
comparative negligence system, the fault of the victim never bars recovery; a
plaintiff who is assigned 99.9% of the fault is still entitled to 0.1% of his
damages. This result can often seem harsh or ludicrous. Maybe we would be
better off with a "modified" system whereby victims at 80% or higher are
barred.'
Meanwhile, courts are routinely invited to bring the old contributory
negligence doctrine back into the law "through the back door' 2 by holding
that highly negligent victims are themselves the "sole proximate cause" or "sole
legal cause" of their injuries. I call this defensive argument the "Johnson
heresy," after Alston Johnson, if not its inventor then certainly its most articulate
and relentless advocate.' To me, the argument is heretical for two reasons:
(a) it contradicts Article 2323;"' and (b) as indicated in Section III above, it
transfers the affirmative defense of victim fault from Page Two to Page One,
thereby transmogrifying its substance as well as shifting the burden of proof on
the issue from defendant to plaintiff.
In two recent cases, courts rejected the Johnson heresy with some vehe-
mence. 's The defendant power company in Weaver v. Ward argued that the
fault of an electrocution victim-the operator of a tall cotton-picking machine
who should have known better than to get close to defendant's high-voltage
wire-was so great and dramatic as to prevent defendant's fault (in having the
wire too low for conditions) from being a legal cause of the accident. Not so,
said the second circuit:
121. The two prevalent "modified" versions cut the plaintiff off at 50% (see, e.g.; Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 1995)) or at 51% (see, e.g., Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 27-1-702
(Smith 1995)). But there is nothing magic about those numbers.
122. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123,1136(La. 1988). See also Justice v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 908 F.2d 119, 124 (7th Cir. 1990) (labeling a defensive argument "a transparent effort
to circumvent Indiana's comparative negligence statute by relabeling negligence as proximate cause").
123. See H. Alston Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/RIsk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev.
319 (1980); and Robertson, Ruminations, supra note 15. In Maraist and Galligan, supra note i, at
374-76, Maraist and Galligan summarize the Johnson-Robertson debate and report that the courts
have not definitively resolved it.
124. In its pre-1996 version, Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 began with the phrase "[w]hen
contributory negligence is applicable," allowing Johnson to argue for judicial flexibility in treating
victim fault. See Maraist and Galligan, supra note 1, at 374. That phrase is now gone. Article 2323
by its terms now covers "any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss."
125. Weaver v. Ward, 615 So. 2d 1375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) and Ventress v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 666 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
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[T]he suggestion that VEMCO's negligence is somehow legally
subsumed by Weaver's alleged greater negligence is nothing more than
an assertion either that Weaver was 100 percent at fault or that he
assumed the risk of the harm that befell him by climbing atop the cotton
picker in the face of the known danger after the picker snagged the
lower wire. Weaver's negligent conduct is not a legitimate, or a
"policy," reason that excuses VEMCO's negligence. In such cases, "the
claim for damages shall not be defeated, but the amount of damages
recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage
of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury ...." C.C.
Art. 2323. 26
In Ventress v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., a train that did not give an
adequate warning of its approach struck a pickup truck whose bad brakes
prevented its stopping in time to avoid the train. The Johnson heresy came to
court wrapped up in an argument that the "failure of the [pickup's] brakes was
the sole cause of the accident."' 7 This "sole cause" argument had a potential
cause-in-fact dimension, which the fourth circuit answered by pointing to
evidence that a proper warning of the train's approach "would have provided the
plaintiff with sufficient time in which to stop in spite of the defective
brakes."' 29 The fourth circuit then made short shrift of the Johnson heresy:
"The duty owed by the locomotive is to all approaching vehicles, not just to
those with good brakes."'29
Judging from Weaver and Ventress, the Johnson heresy is easy to spot and
easy to reject once spotted. But one cannot so generalize: the heresy sometimes
persuades.'30 In Freeman v. Julia Place Limited Partners, a pathologist was
out walking his dog about eleven o'clock one night when he got a pager call
126. 615 So. 2d 1375, 1384 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
127. Ventress v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 666 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), mod.
on other grounds, 672 So. 2d 668 (1996) (quoting the trial judge's reasons for granting JNOV).
128. Ventress, 666 So. 2d at 1214.
129. Id. at 1215.
130. In addition to the Freeman and Fowler cases discussed in the text, see Mack v. City of
Monroe, 595 So. 2d 353, 357-58 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 314 (1992) (holding
that the city's lack of alacrity in arresting the plaintiff's violent ex-boyfriend was not a legal cause
of injuries that the court felt she had brought upon herself by not avoiding him more assiduously).
Cases like Mallery v. International Harvester Co., 690 So. 2d 765, 768 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that a "sophisticated user" of a product is not entitled to a warning of defects of which he
should be aware), may be instances of the success of the Johnson heresy but are also possibly
explained as no-breach cases. The no-breach explanation would be roughly as follows; Products like
the one at stake in Mallery threaten only sophisticated users. Respecting the B side of the B<PL?
scale: It would be costly to warn such users, and the warning would have a very limited benefit; all
it would do would be to remind the product's users of what they already know. Respecting the PL
side: the likelihood of sophisticated users forgetting what they already know, so that they need the
reminder that the warning would have givenis not very great. On balance, therefore, B > PL; we
don't want manufacturers to incur the cost of such limited-utility warnings.
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telling him to scurry to the hospital where he worked.'3 ' When he found that
he couldn't get back into his apartment complex because the gate lock was
faulty, the pathologist tried to climb the spiked security fence and hurt himself.
He lost his lawsuit alleging negligent maintenance of the lock at the summary
judgment stage. Affirming that disposition, the fourth circuit stated:
Reasonable minds could not conclude that the non-functional lock
was the legal cause". of Freeman's injury. Freeman argues that it is
foreseeable that a tenant who is locked out would attempt to jump the
gate and there is an easy association between Julia Place's duty to
maintain the gate and Freeman's injury.
The spiked gate is not an ordinary fence and was obviously built as
a security gate to prevent access to the premises by an intruder.
Freeman's attempt to climb the gate was grossly unreasonable and
reckless. A lessor's duty to maintain a security gate lock does not
encompass the risk (or even the possibility) that a tenant would attempt
to scale such an obviously dangerous gate. We conclude that Julia
Place is not liable under the duty-risk analysis as a matter of law."'
Fowler v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. was a doctrinally
identical case to Freeman in which a homeowner's negligence caused herself and
the plaintiff to be locked out on a second-floor balcony along with two whiny
children." 4  Soon despairing of being rescued, the plaintiff-5'10", 218
pounds-tried to jump and broke his leg. Affirming a bench-trial judgment for
the defendant, the second circuit stated that "the true legal cause' of the
accident" was the plaintiff's own foolhardy conduct."'
It is hard to see Freeman and Fowler as anything other than contributory
negligence for the fully feckless. I think one can tell that is what they are-as
opposed to "legitimate" legal cause determinations-by positing otherwise
identical situations in which the victims were innocent. If the victim in Freeman
had been fleeing a mugger rather than hurrying to get to work, would the
defendant have escaped liability on legal cause grounds? Would the Fowler
court have let the homeowner off the hook if the plaintiff's jump had been
necessitated by an acute medical need of one of the children? In each case, I
think not. And I think this shows that the cases were defacto applications of the
131. 663 So. 2d 515, 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 680 (1996).
132. A red flag goes up in my mind whenever I see the phrase "the cause." On both the cause-
in-fact and legal cause fronts, the plaintiff satisfies his burden by showing that the defendant's
negligent conduct was a cause. The "the cause" locution almost always encodes unstated reasons
for denying recovery; I would prefer to see the reasons spelled out.
133. Freeman, 663 So. 2d at 519.
134. 485 So. 2d 168, 169 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 487 So. 2d 441 (1986).
135. See supra note 132.
136. Fowler, 485 So. 2d at 170.
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old doctrine of contributory negligence or assumed risk, both of which have
supposedly been wholly absorbed into the percentage-fault system.
We obviously need some way to say no to plaintiffs like Dr. Freeman and
Mr. Fowler. But I don't think the present law affords a way. In my view, the
way found by the Freeman and Fowler decisions-which I would characterize
as instances of ad hoc and selective victim-fault barring-costs the negligence-
law system too much. As long as there is even a single reported authority
coming out that way, well-represented defendants will press the argument on the
courts in every case in which it has the slightest hope of succeeding. I don't
think we want the Weaver and Ventress defendants to fight the legal cause issue
quite as hard as they fought it. I don't think they would have fought it that hard
if cases like Freeman and Fowler had not been on the books. Until and unless
the law, changes to say that at some point victim fault is great enough to defeat
recovery, we are better off with heavily discounted awards in high-victim-fault
cases than with acknowledging the occasional legitimacy of a contributory
negligence/assumed risk doctrine in "sole legal cause" disguise.
D. Postscript: "An Alternative Design Capable of Preventing the Damage"
The Louisiana Products Liability Act conditions a manufacturer's liability
for a product's design defect on a showing by the plaintiff that "[t]here existed
an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the
claimant's damage."' 37 In Bernard v. Ferrellgas, Inc., the manufacturer of a
custom-made meat smoker argued that this provision required the plaintiff to
show that the proposed alternative design would have "totally prevented" the
injuries in suit.'38 The third circuit rejected that argument, reading the statute
to require only a showing that the alternative design "would have significantly
reduced the chances" of an accident of the sort that befell the plaintiff.' A
recent federal district court decision is in accord, holding:
"Capable" does not mean that the alternative design definitely or
completely would have prevented the damage. It does mean, however,
that the alternative design would have been significantly less likely than
the chosen design to cause the damage for which the claimant has filed
suit or that the alternative design would have significantly reduced such
damage."0
137. La. R.S. 9:2800.56 (1991).
138. 689 So. 2d 554, 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
139. Id.
140. Wilson v. HobartCorp., No. 95-2279,1996 WL 117502, at* 3 (E.D. La. March 15, 1996)
(quoting John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49 La. L. Rev. 565, 597
(1989)).
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IX. CONCLUSION: THE HIGH MIDDLE GROUND
Professor Galligan's Inspired Ramblings shows great wisdom and insight in
reminding us that the essence of negligence law is its zeal for fair resolutions,
a zeal that guarantees that the process will always exhibit remarkable flexibility.
The trick is to maintain flexibility while avoiding the appearance or reality of ad
hoc adjudication. The law needs to stay in the middle ground between rigidity
and opportunism.
The negligence system takes that high middle ground when it upholds the
distinctions among the five issues on Page One and honors the separateness
between the matters treated on Pages One and those relegated to Pages Two and
Three. The care and upkeep of these boundary fences is the principled business
entailed in maintaining negligence as a legal system. That is what all this fuss
has been about.

